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Abstract
This paper studies how the imperfect collateral assignments of patents con-
tribute to “deep pockets” savings of innovative firms facing random investment
opportunities in research and development (R&D) and determine the growth
of their innovations, using a version of the Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] model
of credit cycles. Results are: patents as collateral leverage R&D finance and
magnify the eﬀect of innovative rents on investment; the composition of current
versus future financial constraints implies that firms savings decrease the steady
state aggregate debt/patent ratio; the interaction between households and firms
savings determines a leveraged growth of innovations which increasing when
legal reforms reduce the imperfection of patents as collateral.
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“It is the uncertainty created by this legal and regulatory structure [in
the United States] which lends to the very market imperfections and ineﬃ-
ciencies currently minimizing the ability to leverage the value of intellectual
property assets and consequently stunting the economic growth of inventors
and entrepreneurs” Murphy [2002] report to the United States Patent and
Trademark Oﬃce.
1. Introduction
The practice of lenders receiving a collateral assignment of a valuable patent port-
folio conditional upon the occurrence of continuing default is slowly becoming more
and more prevalent and important in the United States.1 Wealth creation is increas-
ingly based on innovation that, in turn, can give rise to important intellectual property
rights. Nakamura [2003], for example, found that private US firms invested at least US
Dollars 1 trillion in intangible assets in 2000, a level of investment that roughly equals
the gross investment in corporate tangible assets. For many companies, these intellec-
tual property rights may represent their most valuable assets. Unfortunately, many
innovators lack the capital necessary to develop new research and must turn to outside
sources for funding. Due to the limited availability of physical capital as collateral, in-
novators may face an external finance constraint fostered by the particular importance
of adverse selection and moral hazard problems when financing R&D. There is now
considerable empirical evidence that variables related to financing constraints such as
leverage and/or cash flow availability are correlated with R&D investment in several
countries (see Hall’s [2002] survey). Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen [1999] explain
that “A more traditional interpretation of the innovation-market power correlation is
that failures in financial markets force firms to rely on their own supra-normal profits
to finance the search for innovation. The availability of internal sources of funding
(‘deep pockets’) are useful for all forms of investment, but may be particularly im-
portant for R&D”. The providers of capital may require more frequently collateral
assignments of valuable patents.
Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] and Kiyotaki [1998] are seminal papers dealing with
the magnifying eﬀects of collateral availability constraints in order to explain business
cycles movements. This paper applies similar incomplete financial contracts to the
collateral assignment of patents combined with random profitable R&D investment
opportunities. We explore their eﬀects on firms’ R&D investment and savings at the
microeconomic and at the aggregate level. Furthermore, we investigate the interaction
1Several services (PatentRatings, M-CAM, PLX, etc.) provide valuations of patents
as collateral information since the end of the nineties (see their websites links at
www.bl.uk/collections/patents/othlinks3.html).
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between households’ intermediated savings and innovators’ savings and its aftermath
on the growth of patents. Since innovation is viewed as a major factor of growth when
monopoly rents provide incentives to entrepreneurs2, the financing of investment and
the financing of R&D investment in particular may aﬀect economic growth.3
The paper has three goals. First, it provides the conditions for significant leverage
eﬀects of the collateral assignment of patents on the growth of innovation, as this
practice is likely to be become widespread in the near future. It shows in particular
that the dependance of innovations on past innovations increases with innovative rents
relatively more than in standard expanding variety growth models based on R&D
(Romer [1990], Grossmann and Helpman [1991] and recent contributions based on
those models analyzed in Gancia and Zilibotti [2004]). Secondly, it models the joint
consequences of lumpy R&D investment opportunities and financial constraints on
individual firms savings (”deep pockets”), on the aggregate leverage (or debt/patent
ratio), and on financially constrained economic growth. Finally, we derive the rate of
return of innovation to be higher than the credit interest rate in a growing economy
and the growth of patents to be a decreasing function of the interest rate, which is
not the case in the standard R&D endogenous growth models. The model departs
from the Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] small open economy credit cycle model in various
ways: it is based on a closed economy with endogenous interest rate, the size of the
aggregate capital stock is no longer fixed, but may grow over time, and expected
monopoly rents on existing patents are used as collateral, so that they increase the
value of collateral, the available amount of loans and economic growth. The model is
the first one dealing with collateral assignment on patents in the economic literature
on finance, innovations and growth.
Several predictions of the model are consistent with the available firm level econo-
metric evidence. First, the reduced form cost function of R&D investment estimated
by Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen [1999] could be derived after linearization from
the microeconomic model of innovators in section 2. More precisely, the novel pre-
diction of the model is that, when valuable patents are used as collateral by an in-
novative firm, the sensitivity parameter of patents with respect to cash flow increases
in a non linear fashion. Causality between cash flow and R&D investment goes both
ways in the sense that pre-innovation rents for financially constrained firms as well as
post-innovation rents are related to R&D investment (Hall, Mairesse, Branstetter and
Crepon [1999]).
The model recommends an institutional policy, which has been much less advo-
cated by economists than by lawyers (Murphy [2002]), improving the laws dealing with
security interest in patents in order to greatly reduce the uncertainty surrounding the
use of patents as collateral. Transfers of property rights over the income of patents
2See Aghion and Howitt [1992], Romer [1990], Grossman and Helpmann [1991].
3See Greenwood and Jovanovic [1990], Bencivenga and Smith [1991, 1993], King and Levine [1993],
Saint-Paul [1993], Bose and Cothren [1996], De la Fuente and Marin [1996], Levine [1997], Acemoglu
and Zilibotti [1997], Benhabib and Spiegel [2001], Keuschnigg [2004].
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should become enforceable, not only against the debtor, but also against competing
creditors (“perfection”) at low cost. Lenders have to be protected against the bor-
rower’s ability to transfer, abandon or license the patent collateral and against the
borrower’s lack of continued patent maintenance, prosecution and exploitation. These
legal improvement are a way to rise the debt ceiling constraint and the growth of in-
novations. However, the model specifies that large eﬀects on the growth of innovation
of such an institutional policy show up only for a low equilibrium interest rate and
relatively large growth rates.
The paper is organized as follows. The microeconomic behaviors of agents are
described in section 2. Section 3 provides the conditions for steady state aggregate
growth. Section 4 concludes the paper with a discussion of the results and related
research.
2. The model
2.1. Households
A constant population of wage-earners households is distributed on [0, L], with L = 1.
On each date t, an household maximizes a constant intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution utility function discounted over an infinite horizon: Ut =
P+∞
τ=0 u(ct+τ) (1 + ρ)
−τ
with u(ct) = (c
1−σ
t − 1)/(1− σ) for σ > 0 and σ 6= 1 or with u(ct) = ln (ct) for σ = 1.
Consumption at time t is ct ≥ 0, the rate of time preference is ρ ≥ 0, the discount rate
is 1/(1+ρ), and the elasticity of substitution is σ. Households supply inelastically one
unit of labor used in the final goods industry and are paid at a real wage rate wt. They
have no disutility of labor. They lend to entrepreneurs and earn a rate of return rt−1 on
their wealth bht−1. The law of motion of their wealth is: b
h
t = (1+rt−1)b
h
t−1+wt−ct. The
initial wealth bh0 is given and identical for all households. Then, optimal consumption
growth gc is given by:
1 + gc,t+1 = ct+1/ct = Ct+1/Ct =
Ã
1 + rt
1 + ρ
! 1
σ
, (2.1)
where Ct = ctL denotes aggregate consumption. The growth rate of consumption
increases with the return on savings and decreases with the rate of time preference
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which measures the willingness to
smooth consumption over time.
2.2. Production of the final good
As in other “increasing product variety” models (Romer [1990], Grossman and Help-
mann [1991]), the economy has three sectors of production: a final goods sector, whose
price is taken as numeraire, an intermediate goods sector, whose output is used in the
production of the final good and an R&D sector which discovers blue-prints allowing
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the creation of new intermediate goods. A large number of producers of the final
good, indexed by j, operate in perfect competition. The final good Yjt is produced
from labor and intermediate inputs, which are fully used up within the period and
have to be bought again the next period. Intermediate goods are defined on a set
{Xjt(i), i ∈ [0, Nt]}. The quantity Xjt(i) is the amount of intermediate good i used in
the production process of the final good. The value Nt represents the most recently
invented intermediate good, so that the interval [0, Nt] is the variety of intermediate
goods available in the economy. Technical progress is described as the invention of new
intermediate goods which adds to the range of intermediate goods already invented,
and implies an increase of Nt over time. Then, the constant return to scale production
function of the final good for each producer is given by:
Yjt = AL
1−α
jt
Z Nt
0
Xjt(i)
αdi with 0 < α < 1. (2.2)
The representative producer of final goods maximizes profit while buying interme-
diate goods at given prices pit and paying wages wt:
(Xjt(i), Ljt) ∈ ArgMax
Ã
Yjt − wtLjt −
Z Nt
0
pitXjt(i)di
!
, (2.3)
which gives the first order conditions that marginal product has to equal the price
for each input:
(1− α)Yjt
Ljt
= wt (2.4)
αAL1−αjt Xjt(i)
α−1 = pit for i ∈ [0, Nt]. (2.5)
The last equation leads to the following demand function for intermediate inputs:
Xjt(i) =
Ã
αA
pit
!1/(1−α)
Ljt for i ∈ [0, Nt]. (2.6)
The demand function for intermediate inputs has a constant price elasticity: 1/(1−
α) > 1.
2.3. Production of intermediate goods
The producers of each intermediate non durable good, indexed by i, act as monopolists
selling their goods to the producers of final commodities at a price which adds a
mark-up to marginal costs. They have to pay a rent πit to the innovator for using her
blueprint at each date t. Production of intermediate goods takes place at constant
marginal cost, which is assumed to be equal to the price of final output Yjt normalized
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to 1. Summing the individual demand for intermediate inputs equation (2.6), the
profit flow of a producer of an intermediate good is given by:
max
pit
πit = (pit − 1)
X
j
Xjt(i) = (pit − 1)
Ã
αA
pit
!1/(1−α)X
j
Ljt (2.7)
With
P
j Ljt = L. The solution for the monopoly price is
pit = p =
1
α
> 1. (2.8)
Hence, the price pit is constant over time and the same for all intermediate goods
i. The monopoly price is the markup 1/α on the marginal cost of production equal to
1. If we substitute for pit from equation (2.8) into equation (2.6), we can determine
the aggregate quantity produced of each intermediate good:
Xt(i) =
X
j
Xjt(i) = X =
³
α2A
´1/(1−α)
L < XMC = (αA)1/(1−α) L (2.9)
which is also constant over time and across all intermediate goods i. Because price
exceeds marginal cost, the quantity X is smaller than it would be if intermediates
were prices at marginal cost XMC by a factor α1/(1−α) < 1. This ends up with a lower
level of output reduced by the same factor α1/(1−α). If we substitute for pit and Xt(i)
from equation (2.8) and (2.9) into equation (2.7), we get the monopoly profit flow per
intermediate good sold:
πit = π =
µ
1
α
− 1
¶
X =
µ
1
α
− 1
¶³
α2A
´1/(1−α)
L (2.10)
which is again constant over time and across intermediate goods. The level of
aggregate output is determined from equation (2.9) and (2.2) as:
Yt =
X
j
Yjt =
X
j
AL1−αjt
Z Nt
0
Xjt(i)
αdi = ANt
³
α2A
´α/(1−α)X
j
L1−αjt L
α
jt (2.11)
=
1
α2
³
α2A
´1/(1−α)
LNt =
1
α2
XNt < Y
MC = ANt (αA)
α/(1−α) L
with
P
j L
1−α
jt L
α
jt =
P
j Ljt = L. Output Yt grows over time as the number of
intermediate goods Nt expands over time due to the innovation sector. Output net of
intermediate goods consumption is:
Yt −XNt =
µ
1
α2
− 1
¶
XNt =
µ
1
α
+ 1
¶
πNt. (2.12)
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2.4. R&D Sector: Technology and Finance
Every period, there is a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs distributed over the
interval [0, 1] who are engaged in the R&D activity. They maximize the expected
present value V0 of the consumption of their dividends dt ≥ 0 discounted by the
interest rate rt at which they can borrow or lend, where E0 is the expectation operator
at date 0:
V0 = E0
"
d0 +
τ=+∞X
τ=1
dτ
ΠT=τT=1 (1 + rT )
#
(2.13)
They hold an initial portfolio of a number n0 of valuable blueprints and they
receive an initial endowment of consumption d0. In practice, only 5% of U.S. patents
are valuable (Lemley and Shapiro [2005]). Patent protection is limited: the innovator
faces the threat of obsolescence and/or opposition and litigation due to a close prior
innovation and/or imitation of a proportion of her patent portfolio, with a hazard rate
δ such that the net return of innovation is assumed to remain positive: 0 ≤ δ ≤ π
q
< 1
where q is the unit cost per patent granted (Grossman and Helpman [1991], Eaton
and Kortum [1999], Kwan and Lai [2003], Barro and Sala-I-Martin [2004]).4 This unit
technological cost per patent granted q specifies a linearized cost function of R&D
investment, q · (nt+1 − (1− δ)nt). Leading technology companies spent on average
q = 3.8 million U.S. dollars in R&D costs per patent granted in 1998, according to
a Brody-Berman Associates survey. This lab-equipment model of expanding variety
(Romer and Rivera-Batiz [1991], Barro and Sala-I-Martin [2004]) is directly related
to R&D investment equations used in applied work (Blundell et al. [1999]).
The decision to invest in R&D on date t depends on two factors. First, the en-
trepreneur has an opportunity of finding a number of positive net present value ideas
leading to new valuable patents (
∼
1it>0= 1,where it is the number of new blueprints
obtained in a period) with probability θ (0 < θ ≤ 1) or she has not this opportunity
(
∼
1it>0= 0) with probability 1 − θ. The random variable
∼
1it>0is known by the en-
trepreneur at the beginning of the period t and it captures the empirical observation
that R&D investment is often lumpy (Geroski, Van Reenen, Walters [1997]). Second,
even if she has the opportunity of obtaining valuable patents on date t, she has the
opportunity to supply inelastically one unit of R&D specific human capital (ht = 1) in
her own firm, without disutility of labour, or to withdraw her human capital (ht = 0),
and this decision is too costly to be observed by lenders. This assumption captures the
informational asymmetry between lenders and innovators. The equation of motion of
the stock of blueprints of the inventor is:
nt+1 =
∼
1it>0 ·ht · it + (1− δ)nt. (2.14)
4See Barney [2002] for 1996 U.S. patents mortality rates computed over a large sample: patent
life expectancy varies from 7.6 years to 18 years. Barney’s table 3 presents the eﬀects of patents life
expectancy on U.S. patents average expected value and patent ratings.
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A large number of risk neutral lenders or perfectly competitive financial interme-
diaries pool households savings in order to diversify the risks related to use of patents
as collateral. An entrepreneur has always the ability to threaten its creditors by with-
drawing her human capital input, consume the credit and its interest payments rtbt
(where bt is the stock of debt), repudiate her debt contract and find other creditors
for next periods (Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]). Creditors protect themselves by col-
lateralizing the stock of existing blueprints over which the firm has a monopoly rent
and take care never to let the size of the debt repayment exceed the liquidation value
Vt+1 of the patent portfolio in the next period taking into account that lenders are not
perfectly protected against the borrower’s ability to transfer, abandon or license the
patent collateral to a third party or to competing creditors at no legal costs (Schavey
Ruﬀ [2002] and Murphy [2002]). For a given collateralized loan, a lender faces a prob-
ability 1− µ1 (ranging between 30% to 70% in practice) of receiving no income at all
from the collateral and a probability µ1 of receiving a random proportion eµ2 > 0 of
the value of the collateral net of legal costs. An investor interested in lending based
on such patent portfolio may reduce the risks using the law of large numbers and/or
obtaining infringement enforcement insurance or defense cost reimbursement insur-
ance from insurance companies, such as Swiss Re and Intellectual Property Insurance
Services Corporation. The lender then takes into account the expected loss of the
proportion µ = µ1E (eµ2) of the value of the collateral Vt+1 when deciding the amount
to lend. The lender loans currently at a loan to value ratio of at most µ
1+r
= 30% of
the appraised value to be compared with µ = 0 at the beginning of the Nineties, where
patents where not used as collateral (Edwards, [2002]).5 Lenders loans according to
the following debt constraint:
(1 + rt) bt ≤ µVt+1 with Vt+1 = πnt +
π (1− δ)nt
1 + rt+1
+
π (1− δ)2 nt
(1 + rt+1) (1 + rt+2)
+ ...(2.15)
Vt+1 = ntπ
"
1 +
+∞X
τ=1
(1− δ)τ
ΠT=τT=1 (1 + rT )
#
(2.16)
As in one period models, the patent portfolio nt provides its first return πnt on
date t + 1. For a constant interest rate, the market value of the patent portfolio on
date t+ 1 is:
Vt+1 = ntπ
+∞X
τ=0
Ã
1− δ
1 + r
!τ
= ntπ
µ
1 + r
r + δ
¶
(2.17)
The credit constraint may also be written as a ”leverage” or debt/patent ratio xt
bounded by an endogenous ceiling xc (for homogeneity, the unit cost of a new patent
5An example is GIK Worldwide receiving a patent backed loan from Pitney Bowes Capital of 17
million USD only whereas the value of the patents in technology for delivering high speed broadcast
quality video conferencing was assessed at 57 million USD: the loan to patent value is 30%.
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q multiplies the number of patents):
xt =
bt
qnt
≤ xc = µ
1 + rt
Vt+1
qnt
= µ
π
q (r + δ)
. (2.18)
The collateral constraint eliminates the incentive for entrepreneurs to withdraw
human capital (hence ht = 1) in order to gain the income (1 + rt) bt from lenders.
2.5. Innovators’ behaviour
The innovative firm’s flow of funds constraint states that dividends should be equal to
the profits at date t earned from previously discovered blueprints, to which are added
new debt net of interest repayment and substracted the cost of investment in R&D:
dt = πnt−1 − qδnt−1 − rt−1bt−1 + bt − bt−1−
∼
1it>0 q (nt − nt−1) (2.19)
On date t, entrepreneurs consume at least a positive amount of income or dividends
dm from the corporate income flow generated by previous patents, net of the accounting
provision for depreciation of patents and of interest charges:
dt = (1− st) (πnt−1 − qδnt−1 − rt−1bt−1) (2.20)
≥ dm = (1− s) (πnt−1 − qδnt−1 − rt−1bt−1) > 0 (2.21)
where st < s ≤ 1 is the entrepreneurs saving rate, which is limited by s6. Substi-
tuting consumption from the flow of funds equation (2.19) into the saving rate ceiling
constraint (2.20) and using the debt ceiling constraint (2.18), one finds an upper limit
on the growth of innovations determined by the ceiling of internal savings and by the
debt ceiling:
∼
1it>0 q (nt − nt−1) ≤ s
Ã"
π
q
− δ
#
qnt−1 − rt−1bt−1
!
+ xcqnt − bt−1 (2.22)
When an innovator has an opportunity to invest (
∼
1it>0= 1), the above inequality
amounts to:
(1− xc) qnt ≤
Ã
1 + s
Ã
π
q
− δ
!!
qnt−1 − (1 + srt−1) bt−1 (2.23)
When xc ≥ 1 (that is when rt < µπq −δ), the above constraint does not set a ceiling
on the stock of patents nt but a negative floor. When the interest rate is such that
µπ
q
− δ < rt ≤ πq − δ, patents are limited by:
6An alternative assumption leading to similar results in this model is to assume a logarithmic
utility of innovators consumption along with a rate of time preference ρ so that the saving rate is
s = 11+ρ instead of assuming a linear utility of consumption and a saving rate ceiling s (Kiyotaki and
Moore [1997] and Kiyotaki [1998]).
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nt ≤
³
1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´´
nt−1 − (1 + srt−1) bt−1q
1− xc (2.24)
Definition 1. Let us define conditions A1: µπ
q
− δ < rt < πq − δ.
The entrepreneur maximizes its utility (equation 2.13) subject to the law of motions
of the number of patents (equation 2.14), to the law of motion of debt (the flow of
funds equation 2.19), to the debt ceiling constraint (equation 2.18) and to her saving
ceiling constraint (equation 2.20). The first order condition with respect to debt is
(see appendix 1 for details):
λdt = λ
b
t +
Ã
1 + srt
1 + rt+1
!
Et
³
λdt+1
´
(2.25)
where λbt is the Lagrange multiplier related to the debt/patent ceiling constraint
and where λdt is the Lagrange multiplier of the minimal consumption constraint. The
minimal consumption constraint is binding (λdt > 0) when the entrepreneur currently
faces credit constraint (λbt > 0) or when she expects to face a credit constraint in the
future (Et
³
λbt+k
´
> 0 with k a strictly positive integer). The first order condition with
respect to the stock of patents is:
π
q
− δ − rt
1 + rt+1
= (1− xc) λ
b
t
1 + sEtλdt+1
+
Et
h³
1 + λdt+1
´
(1−
∼
1it+1>0)
i
(1 + rt+1)
³
1 + sEtλdt+1
´ (2.26)
These two first order equations leads to three possible regimes:
Proposition 1. Optimal R&D Investment, Saving and Borrowing at the
Entrepreneur Level.
In each period, innovating firms can be in one of three regimes:
(i) A perfect capital market regime is obtained when λbt = Etλ
d
t+τ = 0 for any
integer τ . The credit interest rate equal the marginal gain of R&D investment rt =
π
q
− δ (equation 5.6), the debt ceiling never binds, debt policy does not aﬀect R&D
investment.
Financially constrained regimes (ii) and (iii) are obtained when λdt > 0: the en-
trepreneur consumes her minimal level of consumption (dt = dm). Those regimes are
feasible under the condition A1 that the credit interest rate is below the marginal
return of R&D investment rt <
π
q
− δ (equation 5.6). Depending on their opportu-
nity to invest, innovators are in regime (ii) with probability θ or in regime (iii) with
probability 1− θ.
(ii) Currently binding credit constraint regime (λbt > 0): The innovator has an
opportunity to invest at date t. She faces binding debt and patents ceilings:
bt = x
cqnt =
µVt+1
1 + rt
. (2.27)
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nt =
³
1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´´
nt−1 − (1 + sr) bt−1q
1− xc (2.28)
(iii) Anticipated credit constraint regime when λbt = 0 and Et
h∼
1it+1>0)
i
= θ < 1
and Etλ
d
t+1 > 0. The innovator has no opportunity to invest and saves as much as
possible in order to decrease debt, determined by the flow of funds equation (equation
2.19), as conditions A1 imply that 0 < π
q
− δ − r < π
q
− δ − rxt−1 :
bt = bt−1 − s
ÃÃ
π
q
− δ
!
qnt−1 − rt−1bt−1
!
< bt−1 (2.29)
The size of the patent portfolio declines due to depreciation:
nt = (1− δ)nt−1 (2.30)
In regime (iii), if an entrepreneur has a long history of no opportunity to invest
in R&D, she may eventually become a net creditor. When an entrepreneur which
has built “deep pockets” over a history of no profitable ideas faces an opportunity to
invest, she invests as much as allowed by the financial constraint due to her linear cost
function and because the marginal return on R&D exceeds the credit interest rate.
3. Aggregate Growth of Innovations
3.1. Aggregate Patent and Debt Dynamics in the Financially Constrained
Regime
Given the optimal investment behavior and credit policy of firms described by propo-
sition 1, we derive the equations of motion for the entrepreneurs’ aggregate patent and
debt. Debt and patents equations are linear in patent and debt, so that aggregation
across entrepreneurs does not require having to keep track of the distribution of the
individual entrepreneurs patents and debt. Aggregate patents and debt are denoted by
capital letters Nt and Bt. Since the population of entrepreneurs is unity, the aggregate
number of patents is limited by the proportion of investing entrepreneurs (θ) times
their patents ceilings (summing patent ceiling inequalities (2.24) over this first group
of entrepreneurs) plus the proportion of non-investing entrepreneurs (1−θ) times their
declining stock of patents (summing equations 2.30 over this second group):
Nt ≤ θ


³
1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´´
Nt−1 − (1 + srt−1) Bt−1q
1− xc

+ (1− θ) (1− δ)Nt−1. (3.1)
The above inequality is an equality when condition A1 is fulfilled. One could
aggregate debt across entrepreneurs in each regime using equations 2.27 and 2.29.
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However, the aggregation of the flow of funds equalities (equation 2.19) leads to an
equation of motion of aggregate debt where θ is directly eliminated:
Bt = Bt−1 − s
ÃÃ
π
q
− δ
!
qNt−1 − rt−1Bt−1
!
+ qNt − qNt−1 (3.2)
When θ = 1, all firms do invest, aggregate debt is proportional to aggregate
patents according to the aggregate debt ceiling constraint (equation 2.18), so that
debt dynamics (3.2) is identical to patents dynamics (3.1) by a proportionality factor.
The opportunity to invest or lumpiness eﬀect (θ < 1) implies that the debt dynamics
diﬀers from the patent dynamics because profits are used either to decrease debt
temporarily or to finance R&D investment now.
The model is closed by households aggregate consumption growth rate Ct =³
1+rt−1
1+ρ
´ 1
σ Ct−1, where the interest rate rt−1 adjusts for savings imbalances in the steady
state. As households consumption Ct does not show up in entrepreneurs patents and
debt dynamics, one proceeds in two steps to investigate the steady state regimes: first
find R&D sector steady state aggregate debt/patent ratio (so that debt and patent
grow at the same rate), then find the equilibrium interest rate such that consumption
grows at the same rate as patents and debt. Using the aggregate patents equation (3.1)
and the aggregate debt equation (3.2), one finds the aggregate debt/patent dynamics
(cf. appendix 2):
xt =M (xt−1) = 1−
1− xc
θ

1−
1
1 +
³
θ
1−xc
´µ1+s(πq−δ)−(1+srt−1)xt−1
(1−θ)(1−δ)
¶

 (3.3)
One has:
∂M
∂θ
> 0,
∂M
∂µ
> 0,
∂M
∂ π
q
> 0,
∂M
∂rt−1
< 0,
∂M
∂xt−1
> 0 (3.4)
The steady state debt/patent ratio is such that x∗ =M (x∗).
Example 1. Figure 1 provides a graphical solution for the steady state loan to patent
value when π
q
= 13%, δ = 8%, s = 60%, µ = 25%, θ = 50%, r = 3%. The loan to
patent value ceiling is then equal to xc = 29.5% (as in the GIK Worldwide case). The
horizontal axis represents the debt/patent ratio xt−1, and the vertical axis xt. The
line y = x intersects the increasing curve M (x) for an aggregate steady state loan to
patent value x∗ = 21.8%. The aggregate loan to patent value is 7.7 percentage points
below the loan to patent value ceiling because 50% of firms do not invest in R&D on
a given date.
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Figure 1: Steady State Aggregate Loan to Patent Value Ratio.
Definition 2. Let us define condition A2: M (0) > 0 ⇔ rt < rmax = µxcmin
³
π
q
´
− δ
with xcmin = (1− θ)
sπ
q
sπ
q
+θ(1−δ) .
Condition A2 states that the intercept of the curve M (x) with the vertical axis is
strictly positive (M (0) > 0) so that the solution of x =M (x) is positive. A positive
steady state debt Bt is obtained for an interest rate below a ceiling rmax which increases
with the proportion of investing entrepreneurs θ. If assumption A2 does not hold, both
aggregate groups of entrepreneurs and of households are net creditors which creates
an excess supply of loanable funds in a closed economy. Condition A2 and A1 define
a non empty set of feasible interest rates (as 0 < xc < 1):
µ
π
q
− δ < rt < min
Ã
1,
µ
xcmin
!
· π
q
− δ. (3.5)
When the loan to patent value factor rises to its current practice level µ = 25%,
condition A2 is not likely to play a role. With the figures of the above example,
µ < xcmin =
0.03(1−θ)
0.03+θ·0.92 : When µ = 25%, the constraint A2 matters only when less than
θ < 8.6% of innovative firms do invest in R&D (when µ = 5%, the constraint A2
matters only when less than θ < 37.5% firms do invest). Proposition 2 follows:
Proposition 2: Financially Constrained Steady State Patent Growth for
Given Interest Rate
(i) When all firms do invest (θ = 1), the steady state loan to patent ratio is equal
to its ceiling x∗ = xc. When some firms do not invest (θ < 1), under assumptions A1
and A2, a unique steady state patent and debt growth exist, with a constant strictly
positive aggregate debt/patent ratio 0 < x∗ < xc defined by the explicit equation
(with Rs,t−1 = 1 + srt−1 and Πs = 1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´
):
x∗ =
1
2θR
n
θ (Rs +Πs) + (1− xc)
h
(1− θ) (1− δ)−Rs −
√
∆
io
with: (3.6)
∆ = {[(1− θ) (1− δ)−Rs] (1− xc) + θ (Πs −Rs)}2 + 4θ (1− xc) (Πs −Rs)Rs
13
As M
³
x, rt−1,
π
q
, θ, µ
´
− x = 0, and as ∂M∂x < 1 for the non demanding suﬃcient
restriction r < θ+δ
s
:
∂x∗
∂r
=
∂M
∂r
1− ∂M∂x
< 0,
∂x∗
∂ π
q
> 0,
∂x∗
∂θ
> 0,
∂x∗
∂µ
> 0, (3.7)
The steady state aggregate debt/patent ratio increases with the proportion of
investing firms θ, with the loan to patent value factor µ, with monopoly rents rewarding
innovation π and decreases with the unit R&D investment cost q and the marginal
cost of debt r.
(ii) The financially constrained (or maximal) steady state growth of aggregate
patents is:
gN = sr
E with rE =
π
q
− δ +
Ã
π
q
− δ − r
!µ
1
1− x∗ − 1
¶
(3.8)
rE is the return on entrepreneurs aggregate equity and is x
∗
1−x∗ the debt/equity ratio.
The growth of patents equals the growth of debt and the growth of internal equity
net of the consumption of dividends (saved earnings/equity). Under the suﬃcient
restriction r < θ+δ
s
, one has:
∂gN
∂r
< 0,
∂gN
∂ π
q
> 0,
∂gN
∂θ
> 0,
∂gN
∂µ
> 0, (3.9)
The steady state patent growth rate increases with the proportion of investing firms
θ, with the loan to patent value factor µ, with monopoly rents rewarding innovation
π, and decreases with the unit R&D investment cost q and the marginal cost of debt
r.
Proof. See appendix 2.
3.2. Steady State Interest Rate and Patents Growth Rate
When the interest rate is equal to the marginal return of innovation rt−1 =
π
q
− δ, the
steady state growth rate of patents is equal to:
g∗ = gC
Ã
π
q
− δ
!
=
Ã
1 + π
q
− δ
1 + ρ
!1/σ
− 1 ≈
π
q
− δ − ρ
σ
≤ s
Ã
π
q
− δ
!
It is positive as long as the interest rate is higher than the rate of time preference
and which can be reached only if it is below the maximal rate of growth of patents
allowed by the financial constraint when rt−1 =
π
q
− δ, equal to s ·
³
π
q
− δ
´
. Else, the
financially constrained growth rate may prevail under the reverse condition:
Definition 3. Condition A1bis for financially constrained growth:
14
s ·
Ã
π
q
− δ
!
<
Ã
1 + π
q
− δ
1 + ρ
!1/σ
− 1
Proposition 3: Steady State Growth Regimes
When conditionA1bis is not fulfilled, the credit interest rate is equal to the return
of R&D investment and there exists a unique steady state growth rate g∗ = gC
³
π
q
− δ
´
.
When condition A1bis is fulfilled, there exists an unique equilibrium interest rate
r∗∗ lower the marginal return on R&D and a financially constrained growth rate g∗∗ =
gC (r
∗∗) = gN (r
∗∗).
Proof. Under condition A1bis, an equilibrium interest rate financially r∗∗ determines
a constrained steady state growth rate g∗∗ when the growth rate of consumption equals
the maximal growth rate of patents:
H (r) = s
Ã
π
q
− δ +
Ã
π
q
− δ − r
!Ã
1
1− x∗ (r) − 1
!!
−
Ã
1 + r
1 + ρ
!1/σ
+ 1 = 0.
As H is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of the interest rate over the
interval
¸
max
³
ρ, µπ
q
− δ
´
,min
µ
1, µ
xcmin
¶
π
q
− δ
·
, as lim
r→
>
µπ
q
−δ
H (r) = +∞ > 0 and as
H
³
π
q
− δ
´
< 0 (condition A1bis), there exists an unique equilibrium interest rate,
corresponding to an unique strictly positive patent growth rate, according to the
intermediate value theorem.
Proposition 4: Two conditions for a strong impact of Murphy’s [2002]
legal reforms on patents growth
Murphy’s [2002] proposes a list of legal improvements in order to greatly reduce
the uncertainty surrounding the use of patents as collateral for lenders and increase
µ = µ1E (eµ2). However, only under condition A1bis, the sensitivity of the growth of
innovations with respect the loan to patent value factor µ is positive. Then, a strong
impact of a change of µ is only obtained under the condition of a large gap between
the equilibrium credit interest rate and the marginal return on innovation, that is only
for high patent growth rate regimes:
∂g∗∗
∂µ
=
Ã
1 + r∗∗
1 + ρ
! 1
σ−1 ∂gN
∂µ
∂gC
∂r −
∂gN
∂r
> 0 with:
∂gN
∂µ
= s
Ã
π
q
− δ − r∗∗
! ∂x∗
∂xc
π
q(r∗∗+δ)
(1− x∗)2
> 0
(3.10)
The collateral constraint rules out Ponzi finance problems. As debt is
always fully backed by a correct evaluation of the expected value of collateral at any
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dates in the future, lenders avoid repayments problems related to Ponzi finance (see
also Araujo et al. [2002]). It is not necessary to add the other no Ponzi finance con-
dition that the growth rate has to be lower than the interest rate for equilibria. For
equilibria such that the growth rate is higher than the interest rate, the entrepreneurs
and households utility is infinite, as in the Ramsey problem, and transversality con-
ditions are not necessary conditions in the infinite horizon (Barro and Sala-I-Martin
[2004]). There also exist financially constrained equilibria with bounded utility as
soon as the entrepreneurs maximal saving rate is below unity s < 1. One needs to
control that households consumption remains positive in high growth equilibria.
Condition for positive households consumption. Aggregate households con-
sumption in the steady state is obtained by the resource constraint of the economy:
output is equal to households consumption, aggregate entrepreneurs consumption Dt,
intermediate goods consumption and the investment in lab equipment:
Ct = Yt −NtX − q (Nt+1 −Nt)−Dt > 0 (3.11)
Output net of intermediate inputs Yt −NtX is given by equation (2.12). Hence:
Ct =
µ
1
α
+ 1
¶
πNt − qgNt −Dt > 0⇒ g <
µ
1
α
+ 1
¶
π
q
− Dt
qNt
(3.12)
Positive consumption are feasible for growth rate which exceed the interest rate,
as 1α > 1, (where α represents the relative share of income allocated to non-labour
input) and provided entrepreneurs saving rate is suﬃciently high so that entrepreneurs
consumption does not crowds out households consumption. To fix ideas, one denotes
when there is no financial constraint, the entrepreneurs given saving rate as 0 < s0 ≤ s
and their debt level as a fraction 0 < µ0 ≤ 1 of the debt ceiling Bt = µ0x∗qNt, so that
entrepreneurs aggregate consumption is:
Dt = (1− s0) ((π − qδ)Nt−1 − rBt−1)
Dt
qNt
= (1− s0)
Ã
π
q
− δ − rµ0x∗
!
1
1 + g
In the financially constrained regime, s0 = s and µ0 = 1, so that entrepreneurs
aggregate consumption is kept at is minimal level.
No collateral regime (µ = 0). Before the end of the nineties, patents were rarely
used as collateral (µ = 0). The innovative firms are not able to use debt to finance
innovation and use only their supra-normal profits to finance innovation (the ”deep
pocket” argument). Financially constrained patent growth is determined by s
³
π
q
− δ
´
for interest rates below r < π
q
− δ .
Perfect collateral regime (µ = 1). When the full value of patents is used as
collateral, such a perfect collateral eliminates the eﬀect of financial constraints on the
growth rate of patents.
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Example 2. Figure 2 below presents a graphical example. Parameters are set as
follows: π
q
− δ = 5%, θ = 1, s = 60%, µ = 0 or µ = 0.25 with r = µπ
q
− δ = 1.25%,
ρ = 1%, σ = 0.5 or σ = 2, . r
0.050.040.030.020.01
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
Figure 2: Equilibrium Growth Rates as a function of Real Interest Rates.
In figure 2, the horizontal axis represents the interest rate and the vertical axis
represents the growth rate. The consumption growth curve is a line rising with the
interest rate, starting from the value of the rate of time preference ρ = 1%. The high
slope rising line corresponds to σ = 0.5. The low slope rising line corresponds to
σ = 2. The vertical blue line represent the asymptote of the financially constrained
patent growth rate: r = µπ
q
− δ = 1.25% for µ = 0.25. The patent growth curve for
µ = 0.25 is first represented by a decreasing curve of interest rate as long as the growth
rate is higher than s
³
π
q
− δ
´
= 3% and the interest lower than r = π
q
− δ = 5%. For
growth rate below s
³
π
q
− δ
´
= 3%, the patent growth rate curve is represented by a
vertical line: r = π
q
− δ = 5%, because of the free entry condition in capital markets.
When no patents are used as collateral (µ = 0), financially constrained patent growth
determines an horizontal line s
³
π
q
− δ
´
= 3% for interest rates below r = π
q
− δ = 5%
(dark dots horizontal line). If the full value of patents could be used as collateral
(µ = 1), the patent growth curve would be fully described by the vertical line even
for growth rate over s
³
π
q
− δ
´
= 3%, as in the perfect capital market case. Above the
rising line g = r, agents’ utilities are not bounded, whereas they are bounded below
this line.
Let us first consider the equilibrium for a strong intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution: σ = 2. This limits the growth rate of the supply of credit. As the consequence,
the equilibrium corresponds to a perfect capital market patent growth rate equal to
2% for a real interest rate equal to 5%.
Let us then consider the equilibrium for a low intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution: σ = 0.5. When patents are not used as collateral, (µ = 0: the US in the
nineties), the patent growth horizontal line intersects the consumption growth line at
the growth rate: s
³
π
q
− δ
´
= 3% for an equilibrium interest rate of 2.5%.
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Now consider the case if Murphy’s reforms are implemented and the practice of
patents as collateral spreads across US innovative firms. Then the patent growth curve
for µ = 25% intersect with the consumption growth curve for a 4% growth rate along
with a 3% interest rate. In this case, the utility is not bounded, but for σ = 1, one
obtains financially constrained growth rate with bounded utility.
3.3. Extensions
Let us consider three extensions of the model.
Extension 1. Endogenous Decision to Invest and R&D Growth Cycles
When the random shock aﬀecting the marginal product of innovation (ηtπ) is not
confined to two states of nature (ηt = 0 with probability 1−θ, ηt = 1 with probability
θ so that Et−1ηt = θ) but distributed over a large number of states of nature according
to a cumulative distribution function F (εt), now with an expectation equal to unity,
Et−1 (εt) = 1, then the probability of a positive net present value R&D project is given
by: θ = Prob (εtπ ≥ q (r + δ)) = 1−F
³
εTt =
q(r+δ)
π
´
. The probability of investing now
increases with the marginal benefit of R&D and decreases with its user cost. Then,
the sensitivity of the growth rate of patents with respect to the interest rate increases
by a term ∂gN∂θ
∂θ
∂r : this eﬀect implies that the absolute value of the slope of the patent
growth curve increases on figure 2 with respect to the case where the probability θ is
constant. However, the average profit rate π (θ) of firms who do invest depends now on
the threshold value εTt and on θ: an increase of the interest rate increases the average
profit rate of firms who do invest. The average π (θ) replaces π in the aggregate flow
of funds equation (3.2) and in the aggregate patents law of motion (3.1). This second
eﬀect partially oﬀsets the first eﬀect of an endogenous decision to invest ∂gN∂θ
∂θ
∂r on the
sensitivity of the growth of aggregate patents to the interest rate. One may also add
macroeconomic and sectorial shocks to the idiosyncratic shock εt in order to generate
R&D growth cycles through a time varying proportion of investing firms θt.
Extension 2. Patent as Collateral against Open Source
There is a concern in the industry of the technology of information and of com-
munication that patents royalties increases the cost of future research (∂q/∂π < 0),
because of the cumulative and sequential use of new ideas. There might be a growth
maximizing proportion p0 of patents providing royalties and a remaining proportion
1 − p0 left as ”open source”. This amounts to maximize the ratio p0πq(p0π) for a given
relation q (p0π)of the unit cost of obtaining a new patent as a function of the cur-
rent cost of using existing patents for this purpose. A company such as IBM decided
recently to leave as open source a proportion 1 − p0 of the their patents portfolio
(The Economist [2005]). However, lenders using patent portfolios as collateral will set
covenants in order to limit the proportion of the patent portfolio which is left as open
source. This will generate a negative correlation between the loan to collateral value
factor µ and open source (measured by 1− p0): ∂µ/∂p0 > 0. The growth maximizing
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proportion of patents not used in open source p0 will be higher when patents are used
as collateral than in the case where patent as not used as collateral, because of this
additional eﬀect ∂µ/∂p0 > 0 in the following first order condition:
p0∂g/∂ (πp0) + (∂g/∂q) (∂q/∂p0) + (∂g/∂µ) (∂µ/∂p0) = 0
Extension 3. Collateral, Physical Capital and Leveraged Growth Mira-
cles.
This leveraged growth model can be extended with the addition of physical capital
used as collateral. The condition that the growth rate has to be lower than the interest
rate in order to avoid Ponzi finance does not fit with the observation of the long run
growth level over 50 years for a dozen of postwar growth miracle countries, such as
Japan and Korea, with average growth rate over 5% and average real interest rate be-
low 5%. A high leverage for leading large firms, along with low real interest rates and
low dividends, using loans backed by collateral on physical assets and by government
insurance is a necessary technique to promote high speed growth although it is not
suﬃcient to explain the eﬃcient allocation of capital in those growth miracles. Con-
trary to conventional wisdom, financial constraints are not necessarily incompatible
with high speed growth.
4. Conclusion
This paper describes an endogenous growth model with lenders limiting credit up to
the collateralizable value of existing patents and with a composition between innova-
tive firms facing a probability to find a positive net present value R&D investment
opportunity or not each period.
First, at the entrepreneur level, financial constraints and lumpiness lead to a spe-
cific entrepreneurs savings behaviour where they build “deep pockets” by anticipating
future financial constraints. When a lumpy R&D investment opportunity occurs, the
dependance of the persistence of R&D investment on the markup rewarding innova-
tions is amplified by the debt/patent collateral constraint.
Secondly, the aggregation of entrepreneurs behaviour, some of them saving for
future investment, some of them currently investing, determines a steady state en-
dogenous aggregate leverage (or debt/patent ratio) below the leverage ceiling.
Thirdly, this financially constrained steady state occurs only for relatively large
growth rates. In these regime, a large eﬀect on growth of reforms protecting lenders
using patents as collateral occurs for low values of the equilibrium interest rate with
respect to the rate of return on innovation, a factor which depends also on the growth
of credit supply and not only on the behaviour of innovative firms.
Extensions suggested that collateral assignment of patents may be detrimental to
open source, because it adds incentives to value patents portfolios and that leverage
driven growth is a necessary characteristic of high speed growth.
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5. Appendix 1
The Lagrangian of the entrepreneur program is:
(nt, bt) ∈ ArgmaxE0
+∞X
t=1
Lt
(1 + r)t
(5.1)
with Lt =
³
1 + λdt
´
dt + λ
b
t (qx
cnt − bt) + λdt (− (1− s) ([π − qδ]nt−1 − rt−1bt−1))(5.2)
where λbt is the Lagrange multiplier related to the debt ceiling constraint, λ
d
t is
the Lagrange multiplier related to the minimal consumption constraint, and with
consumption dt given by the flow of funds constraint:
dt = (π − qδ)nt−1 + bt − (1 + rt−1) bt−1−
∼
1it>0 q (nt − nt−1) (5.3)
The Euler equation on debt bt is
∂Lt
∂bt
= 0, for any date t:
0 = 1 + λdt − λbt +
Et
³
− (1 + rt)
³
1 + λdt+1
´
+ λdt+1 (1− s) rt
´
1 + rt+1
= 0⇒ (5.4)
λdt = λ
b
t +
Ã
1− (1− s) rt
1 + rt+1
!
Et
³
λdt+1
´
= λbt +
Ã
1 + srt
1 + rt+1
!
Et
³
λdt+1
´
(5.5)
The first order condition with respect to the stock of patents is ∂Lt∂nt = 0, that is:
0 =
³
1 + λdt
´
(−q) + qxcλbt
+Et
Ã
1
1 + rt+1
!³³
1 + λdt+1
´ ³
π − qδ−
∼
1it+1>0 q
´
+ λdt+1 (− (1− s) [π − qδ])
´
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One divides by q and substitutes λdt using the first order condition for debt:
0 = −1− λbt −
Ã
1 + srt
1 + rt+1
!
Et
³
λdt+1
´
+ xcλbt
+Et
Ã
1
1 + rt+1
!Ã³
1 + λdt+1
´
(1−
∼
1it+1>0) + 1 +
π
q
− δ + λdt+1
Ã
1 + s
"
π
q
− δ
#!!
Hence:
π
q
− (rt + δ)
1 + rt+1
= (1− xc) λ
b
t
1 + sEtλdt+1
+
Et
h³
1 + λdt+1
´
(1−
∼
1it+1>0)
i
(1 + rt+1)
³
1 + sEtλdt+1
´ (5.6)
6. Appendix 2
The law of motion of the debt/patent ratio xt as a function of its previous value:
xt =M (xt−1) is computed using the aggregate patent growth factor:
Nt
Nt−1
= gθ = θ
µΠs −Rs,t−1xt−1
1− xc
¶
+ (1− θ) (1− δ) . (6.1)
The flow of funds equation can be written as:
Nt
Nt−1
= gF =
Πs −Rs,t−1xt−1
1− xt
= Πs +
µ
Πs −Rs,t−1
xt−1
xt
¶µ
1
1− xt
− 1
¶
. (6.2)
This leads to the implicit relation N(xt, xt−1) = 0:
N(xt, xt−1) = gF − gθ =
Πs −Rs,t−1xt−1
1− xt
− θ
µΠs −Rs,t−1xt−1
1− xc
¶
− (1− θ) (1− δ) = 0.
(6.3)
which can be written as this explicit equation:
xt = M (xt−1, rt−1) = 1−
Πs −Rs,t−1xt−1
θ
³
Πs−Rs,t−1xt−1
1−xc
´
+ (1− θ) (1− δ)
(6.4)
= 1− 1− x
c
θ

1− 1
1 +
³
θ
1−xc
´ ³
Πs−(1+srt−1)xt−1
(1−θ)(1−δ)
´

 (6.5)
A suﬃcient condition for ∂M∂xt−1 < 1:
∂M
∂xt−1
=
(1 + srt−1) (1− θ) (1− δ)h
θ
³
Πs−Rs,t−1xt−1
1−xc
´
+ (1− θ) (1− δ)
i2 < 1 (6.6)
rt−1 <
θ + δ
s
<
(1 + gθ)
2
(1− θ) (1− δ) − 1⇒
∂M
∂xt−1
< 1 (6.7)
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The steady state debt/patent ratio x is given by the following quadratic equation:
N (x, x) = Rs +
1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´
−Rs
1− x − θ


1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´
−Rsx
1− xc

− (1− θ) (1− δ) = 0
The function N (x, x) is continuous on the interval [0, xc] and strictly increasing:
∂N (x, x)
∂x
=
1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´
−Rs
(1− x)2
+ θ
Rs
1− xc > 0
According to the intermediate value theorem, a unique solution exist for a positive
steady state debt/patent ratio 0 < x∗ ≤ xc < 1 under the conditions N (0) < 0 and
N (xc) > 0. First, N (xc) > 0 is always fulfilled as long as θ ≤ 1 :
N (xc, xc) = Rs +
1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´
−Rs
1− xc − (1− θ) (1− δ)− θ
1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´
− xcRs
1− xc ≥ 0
Second, N (0, 0) < 0 leads to condition A2:
N (0, 0) = 1 + s
Ã
π
q
− δ
!
− (1− θ) (1− δ)− θ
1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´
1− xc < 0
⇒ xc =
µπ
q
r + δ
> xcmin = (1− θ)
sπ
q
sπ
q
+ θ(1− δ)
Condition A2 for the steady state debt/patent ratio to be strictly positive implies
that the interest rate should be below the ceiling rmax:
r < rmax =
µ
xcmin
π
q
− δ (A2)
The explicit solution x∗ is found by solving the quadratic equation N(x, x) = 0.
7. Appendix 3. Transitory Dynamics following Legal Reforms
In the perfect capital market case or in the financially constrained case without lumpi-
ness eﬀects (θ = 1), there are no transitory dynamics on aggregate variables following
an increase of the loan to patents used as collateral factor µ after the legal reform.
Hence, the economy jumps from the old to the new steady state when there is a
change of exogenous parameters of the model (in the example 2: from the equilib-
rium with µ = 0 to the equilibrium with µ = 25%, from a 3% growth rate to a 4%
growth rate). The fact that some firms are not able to invest (θ < 1) and save instead
of investing introduces some sand and persistence in the aggregate debt dynamics
(xt =M (xt−1, rt−1)), which is the origin of transitory dynamics.
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The growth rate of aggregate debt of entrepreneurs (determined by the flow of
funds equation) has to match the growth rate of households savings (identical to the
growth rate of households consumption) at each period t in order to correct savings
imbalances during the transitory dynamics. The interest rt−1 is derived as follows:
Ct
Ct−1
=
Ã
1 + rt−1
1 + ρ
! 1
σ
=
Πs − (1 + srt−1)xt−1
1− xt
=
Πs − (1 + srt−1)xt−1
1−M (xt−1, rt−1)
(7.1)
Knowing rt−1, one proceeds to the next step using xt =M (xt−1, rt−1) and solving
the above equation for date t+1 in order to find rt.
7 The convergence will be such that
x∗ (µ = 0) = 0 < xt−1 < xt ≤ x∗ (µ = 25%) with r∗ (µ = 0) = 2.25% < rt−1 < rt ≤
r∗ (µ = 25%) = 3%. The slope of the function M (0 < M 0 (xt) < 1) ensures regular
convergence with to this steady state, without any cyclical, chaotic or indeterminate
patterns (cf. figure 1). During the transition, the growth rate of patents, which
depends on θ, is lower than the growth rate of debt of entrepreneurs when xt < xt+1
and can be computed using the last dynamical equation of the model (with rt−1 given
by the previous computation):
Nt = 1− δ + θ


1 + s
³
π
q
− δ
´
− (1 + srt−1)xt−1
1− xc − (1− δ)

Nt−1. (7.2)
When the interest rate rises, so does the economy growth rate, as in other con-
vergence models based on Ramsey’s savings behaviour. Nonetheless, these dynamics
present a remarkable feature. Because of financial constraints, the transitory dynam-
ics of the credit interest rate and of the marginal productivity is no longer predicted
to be identical. This is not the case in the Ramsey-Solow model of GDP per head
convergence of nations, based on perfect capital markets, where the user cost equals
the marginal product of capital .
7For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed here that the forward looking debt ceiling variable
xc discounts patents royalties at the final steady state interest rate r∗∗ after the initial shock. This
means that the debt ceiling is lower than when discounting the future royalties of existing patents by
the future sequence of transitory interest rate (a second order eﬀect which increases marginally the
speed of convergence).
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